Market-based Investment in Electricity Transmission Networks: Controllable Flow by Brunekreeft, Gert
  
 
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics CWPE 0340 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Market-Based Investment in Electricity 
Transmission Networks: Controllable Flow 
 
Gert Brunekreeft 
 
         








 
         
        


      		
			
	
      	
 
CMI Working Paper 29 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Not to be quoted without permission 
 
 
 
 
         








 
        
         


    M	






      




 
CMI Working Paper  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
MARKET-BASED INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
NETWORKS: CONTROLLABLE FLOW 
Gert Brunekreeft1 
Department of Applied Economics 
University of Cambridge, 
Sidgwick Avenue 
CB3 9DE Cambridge UK 
g.brunekreeft@econ.cam.ac.uk 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/index.htm 
15 Sept 2003 
 
Abstract: This paper discusses unregulated market-based electricity transmission 
investment by third parties as opposed to regulated investment by designated 
transmission system operators. The analysis is set against a European and Australian 
institutional background and focuses on interconnection of different systems. The paper 
explores four areas: economies of scale, market power, detrimental investment and 
risks. The analysis argues for restricting  market-based investment to controllable flow 
(DC or FACTS) only. This is in line with what seems to take place in practice in Europe 
and Australia, it strikes a balance between pros and cons of market-based investment 
and draws a sharp line between regulated and unregulated investments.  
Keywords: electricity, transmission, merchant, investment 
JEL classification: L1, L43, L94.  
 
1. Introduction 
Transmission owners, often the same as the Transmission System Operator, TSO, are 
typically regulated and charged to ensure reliable transmission within their network. 
Vertically integrated utilities have a further duty to deliver power at least cost, and can 
recover the cost of so doing through energy and transmission charges. Regulation may distort 
these choices, and lead to either excessive (Averch-Johnson effects) or sub-optimal 
(particularly in the presence of environmental or planning restrictions) transmission 
investment relative to generation capacity. Nevertheless, there is a presumption that 
transmission investment within the region controlled by the TSO is constrained efficient 
(where the constraint is the efficiency of the regulatory environment). There is no such 
guarantee for interconnections between networks under different TSOs, and there is a 
presumption of under-investment, as it will be difficult to persuade each network regulator to 
pass through those costs that benefit out-of-area users. As a result there is a presumption that 
some (and perhaps considerable) further investment in interconnectors (defined as links 
connecting different networks) is likely to be socially profitable.  
 
                                               
1
 The author would like to thank Martin Godfried, Bill Hogan, Paul Joskow, Katja Keller, Karsten Neuhoff, 
David Newbery and Hans-Joerg Weiss for useful comments. Support from the CMI project 045/P Promoting 
Innovation and Productivity in Electricity Markets is gratefully acknowledged. 
 2 
There are several possible solutions to this under-investment problem. One rather drastic 
solution is to require networks to be aggregated into larger regional groupings (Regional 
Transmission Organisations), and devolve investment planning to these RTOs. That might 
work within a federal country like the US, but would be problematic on the Continent. The 
second is to develop methodologies to reward TSOs for the services their network provides to 
out-of-area users, so that they (or their network users, as a result of reduced network charges) 
enjoy the benefits of improving interconnection. The final solution is to allow merchant 
investors to interconnect different networks, and to receive the network (or connection node) 
price differences: market-based transmission investment. While for instance Australia and the 
USA already have some experience of this, and projects are being planned in Europe, the 
policy discussion is far from settled. 2 
 
The focus of the paper is on Europe and Australia (in contrast to the USA). Increasingly the 
regions in the USA rely on nodal (spot) pricing to congestion manage on the network; in 
Europe and Australia the predominant method is zonal pricing. A region in the USA, for 
instance New York or PJM, contains a large number of differently priced nodes. In Europe 
and Australia, different regions (zones) contain only one price: single-price zones (for 
instance the APX in Amsterdam for the Netherlands). The rewards for merchant transmission 
investment in the USA rely on what is called point-to-point incremental financial transmission 
rights (FTRs), which capture network effects by taking price effects on all relevant nodes into 
account.3 By definition, the zonal approach cannot capture these network effects by means of 
prices and cannot facilitate market-based investment within a zone. The European and 
Australian zonal approaches are therefore  restricted to the interconnection between different 
systems (i.e. single-price zones). Consequently, the focus of the paper is on interconnection 
between different systems as opposed to investment within a system. It also follows that the 
analysis focuses on network expansion (i.e. interconnection) in contrast to network deepening 
or reliability investment. It follows moreover that the analysis focuses on large-scale bulky 
investment in new lines, rather than small-scale network upgrades. 
 
Whereas market-based transmission investment may mitigate the problem of under-
investment, it is unlikely to suffice alone and thus regulated projects by the designated 
transmission system operator (TSO) remain necessary. The inevitable mix of regulated and 
unregulated systems requires a sharp distinction. For the European and Australian context as 
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 In Australia the policy package is known under the header “safe harbours” [e.g. ACCC, 2001]. For the USA it 
is set out in SMD Notice of proposed rulemaking 2002, p. 66, FERC, Docket No. RM01 -12-000. In Europe the 
policy is laid out in the European Commission’s [EC, 2003] Regulation on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity of June 26, 2003. 
3
 It should be noted, however, that new problems arise (see especially section 4.3)  
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set out above, this paper will explore the prospects of restricting market-based transmission 
investment to controllable flow, defined as direct current (DC) and flexible alternating current 
transmission systems (FACTS). Controllable means that the flow on a line can be controlled 
explicitly, rather than being determined implicitly by Kirchhof’s laws as in a meshed 
alternating current (AC) system; as a result, the loopflow effects are substantially reduced.4 
There are two reasons for drawing this line. First, the distinction between controllable versus 
non-controllable flow is sharp and workable. Second, the inefficiencies of market-driven 
decentralized investment in controllable-flow lines are far less than in meshed AC networks 
and may well be offset by the advantages of merchant projects. 
 
Section 2 discusses the background and the literature, while section 3 summarizes the 
principles underlying market-based transmission investment. Section 4 is the core of the paper 
and discusses four main areas of problems with market-based transmission investment and 
their relative severity for controllable versus non-controllable flow. It will be argued that for 
systems which rely on zonal congestion pricing transmission investment in controllable flow 
may be market based, whilst rights to invest in non-controllable flow should be allocated only 
to the designated transmission system operator. The distinction between controllable and non-
controllable flow appears  in practice and it is, for instance, a requirement in EU legislation 
[EC, 2003, art. 7]5 and is part of the Australian “safe harbours” [cf. ACCC, 2001, pp.126 ff.]. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The critical step of market-based transmission investment is that investment in the 
transmission grid is no longer  the exclusive and statutory right of the designated (and as a 
rule, regulated) transmission system operator (TSO). For the European and Australian 
situation, market-based transmission investment can be defined as transmission investment 
“operating between two connection points assigned to different regional reference nodes, [..] 
supported by the revenue stream generated by trading electricity between the two 
interconnected regions, [and] not eligible to earn regulated revenue.” [ACCC, 2001, p. 126]. 
The payment according to the price difference between the two ends of the line is also called 
link-based and applies in particular to interconnectors. 
 
Why allow unregulated third-party transmission investors in the first place? After all, 
transmission is considered to be the domain of monopolies where regulated, designated 
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 Loopflows are explained in section 3. For a technical analysis of controllable flow, the interested reader may be 
referred to for instance Gyugi [1999] and Arrillaga [1998]. 
5
 Art. 7 basically restricts merchant investment to DC lines but allows exceptions for stand -alone AC lines if the 
costs of DC lines would be very high relative to AC. 
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operators are dominant. Apart from the well-known virtues of market forces, three specific 
reasons are convincing. First, vertically integrated (generator and transmission) incumbents 
may have poor incentives to invest in interconnectors. Transmission constraints tend to isolate 
parts of the networks and thereby increase generation market power within the isolated area.6 
Vertical integration still forms an obstacle to a competitive playing field in parts of the USA 
[cf. Joskow, 2003, p. 13] and Europe [EC, 2002]. The second reason, which is actually more 
general than transmission investment, follows from a regulatory problem with risky 
significant new investment. The problem has been extensively discussed in Australia [cf. 
Gans & King, 2003]. Suppose that the investment has to be made under uncertainty about the 
ex-post state of the world which is either good or bad. Suppose that the rate of return of the 
risky investment in case of a bad state of the world is 6%, while 14% if good. If both states 
have equal probability the risk-equivalent expected return thus is 10%. The argument is that a 
regulator will do nothing if the state of the world is bad, while the regulator will be tempted to 
strengthen rate regulation if the world turns out to be good. Assume that the regulator may ex 
post reduce the rate of return in the good state to 10%. Anticipating this, the expected rate of 
return is 8% rather than the required 10%. It is straightforward to see that this may lead to 
underinvestment or abandoning the project. The underlying argument is that a regulator 
cannot credibly commit to refrain from intervening ex post in the good state if the line is 
subject to regulation. It is argued that credibility to refrain from intervening is increased by 
not regulating the new investment at all (for a predetermined number of years): a “regulation 
holiday”.7 A third reason relies on a public-choice argument. Interconnecting a low priced 
area with a high priced area will normally imply that the electricity price in the low priced 
area increases, meaning the consumers in this area actually lose form the new line. If 
authorities of both sides of the new line have to give permission for the new line, the 
authorities on the losing side may hesitate to agree. This problem may be mitigated if 
permission (on economic grounds) is not required, which would be the case under market-
based investment.   
 
The literature on merchant transmission investment is divided. Littlechild [2003] points to the 
drawbacks of regulation and expresses quite strong sympathy for market-based investment, 
relying on Australian experience with the regulatory alternative. The point is illustrative. 
Murraylink was a genuine unregulated market-based transmission investor interconnecting 
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 As a result, a vertically integrated firm faces a trade off: increased interconnector capacity enhances trading 
opportunities but also increases competition from other areas. Which effect dominates is an empirical matter. 
7
 The argument raises discussion as to when regulatory uncertainty (or -threat) is stronger: existing regulation 
which could be strengthened or non-existing regulation which should be installed. Experience with regulatory 
threat in New Zealand suggests that the step to install regulation is large and time-consuming, implying that 
uncertainty might be relatively low. For more on New Zealand, the interested may be referred to Brunekreeft 
[2003, ch. 10].  
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Victoria and South Australia (SA). While Murraylink was being constructed, another project 
called SNI requested access to the regulated connection charges and passed the regulatory test 
in December 2001. A project only passes the regulatory test if maximizes net social benefits 
with regard to a number of alternatives. SNI connects New South Wales (NSW) and South 
Australia (SA), which is largely parallel to Murraylink.8 In the regulatory test two options 
were considered. First, the bundled SNI, building the line plus some upgrading (especially of 
the grid) in NSW. Second, the unbundled SNI which meant only upgrading especially the 
NSW grid, without building the line itself. Cost-benefit analysis revealed that the unbundled 
SNI had a substantially higher value to society. Nevertheless, the bundled SNI was approved, 
based on the argument that, faced with risk of stranded assets the unbundled SNI was not 
commercially feasible: upgrading the grid without building the line would leave the 
investment exposed to the market power of Murraylink. Without commercial feasibility, the 
unbundled SNI could not be considered to be a realistic alternative and thus the bundled SNI 
was approved instead [cf. also Kahn, 2002, p. 13 and NEMMCO, 2001, pp. 13, 14]. The 
arguments in the case centred around the question of the degree of market power of 
Murraylink with respect to the assets of unbundled SNI. As a result of the permission to build 
the bundled SNI, Murraylink expected its unregulated line-based revenues to fall and 
requested for conversion to a regulated operator, which was recently approved. The case has 
been controversial and leads Littlechild [2003, p. 28] to conclude that: “an implication of the 
Australian experience to date is that there may be more danger of excessive than thwarted 
regulatory investment. Even with reform, merchant transmission could remain vulnerable.” 
Although dependent on this distinction, the case illustrates how regulated projects can crowd 
out unregulated projects. 
 
On much the same line as Littlechild [2003], Hogan [2003] argues in favour of merchant 
transmission investment, although with some reservations,. More precisely, Hogan advocates 
drawing a clear line between regulated and merchant investment, to avoid the ‘slippery slope’ 
that the regulated options crowd out the merchant options. Hogan’s [2003, pp. 22/23] 
approach is that: “regulated transmission investment would be limited to those cases where 
the investment is inherently large relative to the size of the relevant market and inherently 
lumpy in a sense that the only reasonable implementation would be a single project like a 
tunnel under a river. [..]  Everything else would be left to the market.” ‘Large’ basically is 
defined as commercially unprofitable.9 The decision rule might thus be that a regulated 
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 The connection points for SNI in NSW and Murraylink in Victoria are close. 
9
 “Further, ‘large’ would be defined as large enough to have such an impact on market prices that the ex post 
value of incremental FTRs and other explicit transmission products could not justify the investment.” [Hogan, 
2003, p. 23]. Regulated here means that the revenues comes from a pool of regulated connection charges. Details 
will be clarified further below. 
 6 
project is socially beneficial but not commercially feasible: in that case, the costs of line 
would partly be financed form the pool of regulated network connection charges. If as Hogan 
[2003, p. 23] suggest “someone” defines the criteria and executes evaluations to determine 
large and lumpy projects, an element of arbitrariness seems inevitable. Alternatively, if the 
rule is not specified, the line between merchant and regulated remains  blurred. 
 
Joskow & Tirole [2003] are more critical of the prospects of market-based transmission 
investment and forcefully point out a number of problems. A first argument is lumpiness in 
transmission investment, which implies that rewards based on marginal prices lead to 
underinvestment [Joskow & Tirole, 2003, p. 21 ff.]. This type of argument is basically in the 
same group as economies of scale as discussed in section 4 below. Further, generation market 
power at one end of the line will distort the prices and thereby the line investment decision 
[Joskow & Tirole, 2003, p. 17 ff.]. This may lead to over- or underinvestment depending on 
the node with market power. A quite special problem is what Joskow & Tirole [2003, p. 25] 
call “state-contingent rights and diversification”; the problem relies on the difficulty to 
determine the line capacity (as an operational capacity), which depends on the flows in the 
connecting networks, which in turn depends on, for instance, demand. If usage of the line is 
sold off by long-term rights, then it is not clear what is to be sold if capacity is not 
determined. The theoretical answer is to sell state-contingent rights, which however are not 
well developed as yet. As the authors [2003, p. 25] note, this problem is typical for AC 
meshed networks.  
 
Another set of problems rely on a governance problem associated with the split between the 
transmission owner (TO) and system operator (SO) which is inherently related to merchant 
investment. The problem is who gets paid for what. The details are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it seems that as above the problem is less severe in the DC case because the flow 
and thereby the “output quantity” can be controlled by the line owner. A problem which 
receives in-depth attention in Joskow & Tirole [2003, pp. 39 ff.] is the problem that the new 
line may be detrimental to the system (due to loopflow effects). The problem has been 
discussed in for instance Bushnell & Stoft [1996c] and will receive detailed attention in 
section 4.3 below. A last point to be mentioned is regulatory risk [Joskow & Tirole, 2003, p. 
57]. It is suggested that regulatory uncertainty may make funding of the merchant projects 
infeasible. Whereas this is a strong argument, it should be noted that regulatory uncertainty 
was at least in Australia the predominant reason to grant regulation holidays and rely on 
unregulated merchants in the first place. In all, Joskow & Tirole point out a set of possible 
inefficiencies, which overall appear to be severe for network-deepening investments in 
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meshed AC networks, whereas the arguments lose part of their strength for interconnection 
DC lines, as will be argued below. 
 
The difficulty identified in these papers is the regulatory mix of the unavoidable co-existence 
of regulated and unregulated lines. The difficulty is to find a stable and workable borderline 
where crowding out of commercially viable projects by regulated projects (or reverse) is 
unlikely. Especially for zonal systems like Europe and Australia, merchant investment may be 
restricted to DC interconnectors between different systems whereas AC projects may be 
reserved for designated TSOs or authorised tenders. This would at least draw a sharp line.  
 
3. Locational marginal pricing, line rentals and investment  
The principle underlying merchant investment is called locational marginal pricing (LMP), or 
nodal spot pricing, which was developed for congestion management by Bohn, Caramanis & 
Schweppe [1984] and was worked out and applied in New Zealand [cf. Read & Sell, 1989; 
and Read, 1989]. An important formalisation and modification came with the contribution of 
Hogan [1992], who extended the basic model by a set of financial hedges, so-called Financial 
Transmission Right (FTRs).10 Meanwhile, the LMP-FTR approach has been (or will soon be) 
implemented in some variation in several states in the USA (e.g. PJM, New York, New 
England, Texas and California) and is a cornerstone of FERC’s currently debated Standard 
Market Design. Europe and Australia do not have nodal spot pricing but at best zonal pricing. 
Basically this means that for an area like, for instance, the Netherlands there is only one spot 
price and the network is not further differentiated (as if the network is unconstrained). Nodal 
spot pricing would define a set of different nodes within the Dutch network, which, depending 
on congestion within the network, might have different prices. In the nodal pricing scheme a 
new line connects two different nodes (quite possibly within one network), whereas in Europe 
and Australia a new line is more likely to interconnect different networks and trade between 
the associated zonal prices. As a result, the European and Australian interconnectors can 
roughly be considered as two-node interconnectors.  
 
The basic idea is straightforward. Consider a two-node network with a transmission line 
between the two nodes. Suppose that at each node a spot price reflects the marginal costs of 
electricity at that node at that moment. As long as the spot prices at the two nodes differ, then 
the difference must reflect the opportunity costs of transmission, otherwise traders buy power 
at the cheap node and sell at the expensive node until the price differential is zero. The 
opportunity transmission costs to be reflected rely on energy losses and congestion (also 
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 Also known as Congestion Revenue Rights. 
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called, constraints), which can be seen as the limiting case of energy losses.11 If the load 
increases up to the line’s capacity the line will be congested. At that point the TSO will have 
to secure a dispatch such that the load on this particular line is not further increased. In other 
words, congestion in the lines affects the dispatch of the generation units, such that a price 
differential between the nodes remains. 
 
Some situations in electricity networks can usefully be represented by a two-node network. 
Typically, however, an electricity network consists of many different interconnected nodes, 
creating a meshed network. A network with alternating current (AC) creates so-called 
loopflows. Electric power in an AC-network follows Kirchhof’s law, meaning that a power 
flow divides itself over the network proportional the inverse of the line impedances.12 The 
idea is illustrated in figures 1a and 1b. In these figures, representing a three-node network, 
nodes G1 and G2 are generation nodes and node D3 is a load node. Line Lij is the line 
between nodes i and j. The three lines are assumed to have the same physical impedance and 
are equally long. Hence the route from node 2 to node 3 over L12 and L13 is twice as long as 
over L23, and thus the impedance on the short route is half the impedance of the long route.  
 
Figures 1a and 1b: Loopflows in a three -node AC network. 
 
In figure 1a, it is assumed that there are no line constraints and the load of 900 MW is 
completely generated by G2. The power flows according to the inverse of the line impedances 
and thus 600 MW flows over L23 and 300 MW over L12 and then L13. In figure 1b it is 
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 The reader may note the equivalence with congestion charging in road pricing as developed by Mohring & 
Harwitz [1962]. Since energy losses are a squared function of the line load, the optimal transmission charge is 
twice the energy loss. If the system-dispatcher (TSO) minimizes the production costs (given demand), then the 
nodal prices will exactly reflect this. Half of the revenues from the transmission charges would cover energy 
losses (which are real costs) and the other half is a surplus, similar to the Pigouvian tax. 
12
 In technical terms, the impedance is the “sum” of the line’s resistance and reactance. 
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assumed that the dispatch is 600 MW from G2 and 300 MW from G1. The 600 MW from G2 
divides 400 MW on line L23 and 200 MW on L12 and then L13. The 300 MW from G1 flows 
200 MW over L13 and 100 MW over L12 and then L23. In total thus, the flow over L23 is 500 
MW, L13 is 400 MW and L12 100 MW. The flow on L12 is determined by subtracting the 
opposing flows: 200 MW - 100 MW is 100 MW. The dispatch in figure 1b may be the 
resulting dispatch if the lines are constrained. Suppose that G2 has lower production costs 
than G1 such that the dispatch in figure 1a would be the desired dispatch. If the capacity of 
L12 is constrained to 100 MW then the dispatch of figure 1b would be the constrained 
optimum. The unconstrained dispatch of figure 1a would not be feasible, because L12 cannot 
handle 300 MW.13 
 
Figure 1b also depicts nodal spot prices. The spot prices at the generation nodes are derived 
from the marginal production costs at these nodes (for this dispatch), which is 
straightforward.14 The price at the demand node is derived as the marginal production costs of 
one additional demand unit. In this case, 1 MW additional demand would (have to) be 
produced 0.5 MW from each generation node. (0.5 ·30 	
ﬀ
ﬂﬁﬃ! "$#"
complete set of nodal spot prices can be calculated. The transmission charges (denoted by tij) 
immediately follow: t21 = 20&%(' 23 = 10&%)*ﬃ! +' 13 = -10
,.-/0'2143!/051ﬃ7698:10'2;<'2;!>=?/@#A8BC#!ﬃ<'2;!
subsequent lines gives a surplus of 3000
DB#7'EF'2;!G''2;AF'2HIﬃ	91JK	1@#LﬃNM;!HE69#LﬃO 13 is actually 
negative because the flow is from a high price node to a low priced nodes. 15  
 
In an LMP system spot prices are volatile and the spot price on one node depends implicitly 
on all other nodes in the network. In other words, an LMP system involves (short and long 
term) risk for the users. Financial Transmission Right (FTRs) have been developed to hedge 
these risks. An FTR is defined as a contract between any two nodes i and j with a strike 
quantity Rij paying out to the owner of the FTR the difference between the nodal spot prices pj 
and pi times the strike quantity Rij. Hence, the payment of an FTR can be denoted by Tij = 
Rij· (pj - pi). It is important to note that the definition of an FTR is not restricted to the two ends 
of a line; an FTR is defined between any two nodes and makes no reference to a line. The 
TSO, being the collector of the transmission charges, may be the counterparty and the FTRs 
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 Note that for instance G1 = G2 = 450 MW would also be feasible, but not (constrained) optimal. Production 
costs would be higher than under G1 = 300 MW and G2 = 600 MW per assumption. In case G1 = G2 = 450 MW 
the power flow on L12 = 0.  
14
 Note that the cost functions are not given here.  
15
 In this interpretation, the transmission charge is actually paid by the owner of a trading contract between nodes 
i and j. Another way to think of transmission charges is that load pays 40 >PRQSTVU*WXCPKSU(Q@YWZ\[^]?WI_IWI`baWdceVfK >PIQ
node 1 and G2 receives 30  >PIQSTVUWg[ihdj9klmQn`0opl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WIUqVr\cskVqﬂc?WItGkpWISQtGkpPKSQ@`0Qn`Wdcvu*`baWdcvPCcsk]sopl0kwcvTKxXVff*fd Lh  
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may be allocated by an auction.16 Suppose that a trader trading quantity qij to prices pi and pj 
actually pays the transmission charges qij· (pj - pi) to the TSO and hedges this risk with the 
contract Rij· (pj - pi). It can then quickly be seen that if the strike quantity Rij approximately 
matches the real quantity qij, and given that initial payment for the FTR as such, the price 
differences cancel out and the risk is hedged. 
 
The LMP concept proves controversial [cf. Wu et. al., 1996 and Oren et. al., 1995]. This 
debate produced the following important result of Chao & Peck [1996], who contrast the 
LMP-FTR approach of financial transmission rights with a flowgate approach, which relies on 
physical transmission rights. In the LMP approach the “transmission rights” follow from the 
dispatch, while the FTRs are merely financial instruments and do not provide physical 
transmission rights. In contrast, physical transmission rights would be allocated prior to 
production and hence dispatch follows transmission rights rather than reverse (at least, the 
dispatch should take the transmission rights into account as binding constraints). The flowgate 
approach applies powerflow distribution factors (PDFs) to calculate which nodes claim how 
much from the capacity of which line, for congested lines only. Chao & Peck [1996] show 
that under certain conditions the flowgate model gives the same results as the LMP approach. 
This useful result allows one to restrict attention here to the LMP analysis; with caution the 
analysis below may thus be carried over to a flowgate approach and thereby to 
interconnectors in a European and Australian context. 
 
A system of spot prices, be it as refined as a nodal LMP system or as crude as two different 
zones, implicitly defines a pricing rule according to which investment in interconnector 
capacity can be paid: the price differential between different nodes. This can be interpreted as 
a high-level regulatory rule: the rule-maker has decided that market-based line investment 
will be paid according to this rule. That is what the definition of the ACCC states explicitly. 
Section 4 will now explore the problems which may arise with unregulated market-based 
investment paid by the price differentials. 
 
4. Problems and prospects of market-driven investment 
This section discusses four main areas of potential inefficiencies associated with market based 
transmission investment in the context of controllable and non-controllable flows. The four 
areas are: economies of scale and cost-recovery, market power and the size of capacity, 
detrimental investment and risk. 
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 There are variations. For a combination with Contracts for Differences, see Bushnell & Stoft [1996b]. The 
allocation of the revenues of the auction (or in other words, line rentals) is again a different issue. It seems 
natural to allocate the revenue to the line owner as a contribution to the line’s costs. This issue appears to be 
rather controversial. See for instance Read [2002] for the discussion in New Zealand. 
 11 
 
4.1 Economies of scale and cost recovery 
Economies of scale in the construction of transmission lines are substantial. Footnote 11 
pointed to the similarity with the theory on road congestion charging as in Mohring & 
Harwitz [1962]. The long-run effects are well known from this literature and are directly 
applicable here. The congestion charge is a surplus over energy losses which can contribute 
the fixed costs of the infrastructure. The surplus depends on demand relative to capacity. In 
the long run in which capacity is variable the following result holds: if long-run marginal 
costs (i.e. capacity expansion costs) are decreasing in capacity, the surplus resulting for 
optimal capacity will be less than the fixed costs. Hence with economies of scale in the 
construction of new transmission lines, the transmission charges relying on the price 
differentials will not entirely recover fixed costs with optimal capacity size. As a result we 
can conclude that either market-based transmission investment  is not profitable (in which 
case it will not take place) or capacity is smaller than optimal.  
 
Figure 2: Economies of scale in transmission infrastructure 
Source: based upon Fuldner, 1998,  table FE2. 
 
Figure 2 indicates the relevance of economies of scale based on real construction costs [cf. 
Fuldner, 1998].17 Figure 2 plots average construction costs (US$ per MW per mile) in relation 
to the line’s capacity, as the least-cost envelope of different technologies. Similar indications 
come from for example Read [2002] and Perez-Arriaga et. al. [1995], suggesting that not 
more than 30% of total costs could be recovered by LMP differentials if capacity is optimal. It 
appears that DC interconnectors are used for bulk power transactions. As a result the scale 
economies may be exhausted at some point; figure 2 suggests that beyond 750 MW long-run 
                                               
17
 These are line construction costs only and exclude AC/DC converters. Investment costs may include right-of-
way charges, which may be high. If these are high and charged per capacity unit they may dominate the 
construction costs and may cause capacity expansion costs to have constant or even decreasing scale effects.  
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marginal costs are near constant. The extent of economies of scale depends on the fixed costs 
of the optimal technology relative to the size of the market, but typically economies of scale 
get less if the size of the market grows. Hence one would expect economies of scale for DC 
interconnection of different networks which primarily aims at transmission of bulk power to 
be less than small-scale AC network deepening projects; even if these AC projetcs are small 
scale, they may be large compared to the size of their market. The DC-interconnector projects 
in the USA are typically around 1000 MW, which is also the order of magnitude for European 
projects (for instance, UK-Norway or UK-NL interconnectors). The interconnectors in 
Australia are considerably smaller, with capacities around 200 MW. 
 
A first approach to the problem is second-best pricing. Imagine that an implicit tender (where 
some body such as a regulator, chooses between different alternatives) determines the line 
owner. With competitive bidding, the result would be a second-best capacity of the line where 
the line rentals would exactly recover costs with mark-ups on marginal costs. With relatively 
inelastic demand, the deviation from the optimum caused by the mark-ups on the marginal 
costs may actually be rather small. The relative deviation from the first-best solution gets 
smaller the larger the line. This argument is appealing but can be criticized on two accounts. 
First, a second-best solution would be inferior if a first-best solution with two-part pricing is 
feasible; theoretically, the first-best solution with two-part pricing (congestion plus 
connection charges) can be achieved by the designated and regulated TSO and hence there is 
a trade-off involved. Second, an implicit auction for the right to build the line is not entirely 
compatible with a decentralized scenario. 
 
A second way to proceed is user-specific two-part pricing, although this is not as obvious as it 
might seem. Apart from an LMP based variable charge a fixed use-of-system charge may 
contribute to the remaining costs. It is in principle possible, but cumbersome and theoretically  
weak. The idea is to develop an algorithm which allocates the costs of the line in some 
relation to the usage of the line, for which two methods are used: the area-of-influence 
method (also called marginal participation) and tracing (also called average participation).18 
Tracing has the economic advantage of relying on the Shapley value [Kattuman et.al., 2003]. 
The allocation of the cost of the line is irrelevant for the sunk costs of existing lines, but is 
important for cost-recovery of new lines and hence is important for investment decisions. 
Roughly speaking, the more meshed the network is, the more difficult it gets to identify users 
in an economically useful way. Concluding, user-specific allocation of the (fixed) costs of a 
                                               
18
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail and instead the reader may consult Vazquez et.al. [2002] 
and Kattuman et.al. [2003]. The method of area of influence is applied in Argentina where it works reasonably 
well, because of the radial network into Buenos Aires [cf. Woolf, 2003, p. 265]. 
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(new) line can be done, although not without difficulty, and thus user-specific charging is 
possible.  
 
Nevertheless, the argument has a theoretical flaw. Demand for the interconnector is derived 
demand from the arbitrage possibilities between the interconnected spot markets. Assume for 
the sake of the argument that the users of the line are traders who arbitrage between two spot 
markets. The traders generate revenues by buying “kWhs” at the cheap node and selling at the 
expensive node; in other words, their revenue is expressed in variable terms (per kWh). The 
underlying cost structure for using the transmission line will be passed through (if at all) as a 
variable charge by the traders. As long as the traders’ revenues with which the line should be 
paid are variable, the final result will always be second best. Stronger even, if competition 
among the traders is fierce, they would compete each other down to variable costs and would 
not be able to recover the fixed charge. The problem of under-recovery of the costs would 
simply be passed on. If this is the result then the line itself might have been charged with a 
uniform mark-up in the first place. 
 
A third aspect to be considered is whether all costs and benefits are in fact included in the 
LMP-based line revenues and hence whether they are internalised in the investment decision. 
Three issues are relevant. First, new lines will in general have an impact on the reliability of 
the system. A new line may increase reliability in the network by increasing capacity in which 
case the TSO might compensate the line owner. Moreover, controllable flow lines increase the 
system’s transfer capability and add to the system’s stability by being controllable [cf. Gyugi, 
1999, p. 31; and Arrillaga, 1998, p. 8]. On the other hand, especially in the face of loopflows 
the new line might decrease reliability and even require upgrading the network. In that case, 
the line should be charged a deep connection charge for the costs of upgrading. Second, the 
line owner might paid a capacity payment. In for instance PJM, the authorities have created a 
market for generation capacity in which capacity contracts are traded. The capacity prices 
differ according to relative scarcity between different areas. A new line connecting two areas 
with different capacity prices can arbitrage the capacity price difference. Line revenues would 
then consist of energy price differences and capacity price differences. Third, environmental 
effects should be taken into account. New transmission lines will in general have an 
environmental cost, but these costs may be less than the alternatives. For instance, subsea and 
underground cables  are perceived as far less environmentally damaging than overground 
cables. 
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4.2 Market power and size of capacity 
Profit-driven investors will have an incentive to maximize profits rather than welfare. New 
transmission capacity between two nodes will usually lower the price difference between the 
two nodes and hence lower the line rentals. In analogy with normal monopoly type behaviour, 
investors will seek to restrict capacity below the socially optimal capacity.19 
 
Apart from the direct distortion, there may be indirect effects. An important benefit of 
additional interconnector capacity is that it enlarges the relevant markets of the generators; in 
other words, depending on whether market power is on the exporting or the importing node it 
may mitigate market power on the generator side. Assume market power in generation at the 
import node. The direct effect is that additional capacity is the same as an additional 
competitor (say, Cournot-like competition with more firms) and the indirect effect is that 
increased total capacity reduces the margin between (peak) demand and total capacity and 
hence will decrease the probability of a pivotal firm (i.e. a change in the nature of 
competition). Thus a new line may increase competitiveness, but if market power induces the 
investor to keep capacity inefficiently small, the effect on generator competitiveness will be 
inefficiently small as well. 
 
There are several ways to approach the “monopoly” problem. The straightforward approaches 
are either to require passing a “best option” test which compares the proposal against 
reasonable alternatives, or to organize a tender after the project has been identified by a 
commission. Ideally, both cases would result in the second-best solution which may be highly 
preferable to the monopoly outcome. Especially in combination with arguments put forth 
below this is appealling but has the drawback that it inevitably reintroduces an element of 
centralized decision making. 
 
An alternative approach might take the view that the monopoly problem is primarily a 
problem of the AC network and less so for controllable interconnectors. In as far as “parallel” 
lines are feasible at all, controllable flow actually allows a competitive choice. In a non-
controllable system “parallel lines” would still be “monopoly”, because the parallel lines are 
“bundled”. In a DC-system two parallel lines can actually compete in capacity, while in a 
non-controllable system this is technically not possible. Moreover, in a non-controllable 
                                               
19
 Depending on demand and the magnitude of scale economies, the underinvestment may partly be offset by 
preemptive investment (similar to limit pricing). In a world with firm transmission rights the line owner may 
then decide not to use all capacity to restrict availability of the line. In a slightly different setting, the argument 
reminds of the argument put forth in Gilbert, Neuhoff & Newbery [2002] and Joskow & Tirole [2000] that a 
dominant importing generator has an incentive to acquire (and then restrict the use of) physical transmission 
rights in order to retain its market power. Restrictions on capacity withholding would relieve the problem partly, 
but might on the other hand have adverse effects for the level of investment.   
 15 
system, the capacity of line A determines the capacity of “parallel” line B. It follows that 
regarding the capacity decisions, parallel controllable lines are strategic substitutes and 
“parallel” non-controllable lines strategic complements. From this it is then straightforward 
that -if at all- the competitive pressure among controllable lines will be stronger.  
 
A related but slightly different “monopoly” problem is pre-emptive investment, meaning 
strategic investment to deter others. The arguments are much in line with the limit-pricing 
approach developed by Bain, Sylos-Labini and Modigliani.20 If due to economies of scale 
and/or lumpiness entrants can only profitably enter at some minimum effcient scale, the 
incumbent can invest pre-emptively so as just to deter  the entrant. The result is that the 
capacity of the investment is either the monopoly capacity or the minimum capacity which 
just deters entry, whichever is the lower: call this the limit capacity. The pessimistic view is 
that the limit capacity is less than the optimal capacity, which is correct, but it may be the 
wrong benchmark. The optimistic view may emphasize that, given the monopoly problem, the 
limit capacity is at least as big as the monopoly capacity and thus pre-emptive investment 
mitigates this problem.21 In all, the argument stresses that there may be some pressure from 
potential new investors. 
 
Following the line of argument on limit-pricing approaches implies that if demand is large as 
compared to the minimum effcient scale, a point will be reached where it is no longer 
profitable to deter entry. The limit capacity would have to be too large and it might actually 
be more profitable to accommodate new entry. There are assumptions underlying this rather 
theoretical result, but the main lesson seems to hold throughout. If interconnecting DC lines 
are typically used for bulk transaction over long distances, the size of the market may be large 
relative to optimal line sizes. Consequently, the required pre-emptive investment may be 
sufficiently large such that entry accommodation is more attractive. 
 
4.3 “Profitable expansion can be bad” 
The principle of rewarding investment according to the price difference between the two 
nodes which are interconnected by the new line (link-based) is flawed, because it ignores 
network effects. In the debate on the usefulness of LMP, Wu et. al. [1996] and Oren et. al. 
[1995] pointed out that under a regime with link-based LMP-FTRs, profitable market-based 
transmission investment can actually be detrimental to the system and hence be inefficient. 
Consider figures 3a and 3b, which are closely related to figures 1a and 1b.  
 
                                               
20
 Cf. Gilbert [1989] for an excellent overview.   
21
 With lumpiness, pre-emptive investment may even result in overinvestment: i.e. larger than optimal capacity. 
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In figure 3a, there is no transmission line between G1 and G2 and the resulting dispatch then 
is that G2 produces 900 MW and G1 0 MW and the power flows are straightforward. In the 
absence of constraints the prices are 30yG'z//!ﬃA#v !$%vMp#LH	H$	3#!ﬃ! 71ﬃ69'E#HE6!1ﬃ!/Mp#{2'ICG'|ﬃ!# !
G2. Now assume that a merchant invests in a 100 MW line between nodes G1 and G2. The 
corresponding dispatch then becomes as in figure 3b, which corresponds to figure 1b. The 
noticeable change is that the power flows cause the new line to be constrained which then 
alters the dispatch such that G1 produces 300 MW at as can be seen relatively high costs. The 
resulting prices are as given. Assuming link-based payment, it follows immediately that the 
investment is profitable if the investment costs are lower than 2000
 22 Welfare has decreased 
because the production costs have increased while output did not change. Hence, a bad 
modification can be profitable. 
 
Figures 3a and 3b: “Bad” modification can be profitable.  
Source: Bushnell & Stoft [1996b, p. 5]. 
 
The fundamental problem underlying this example is that link-based line rentals, defined as 
the difference between the prices at the two nodes connecting the line, do not reflect 
incremental network effects. Whereas the line transmission charge does reflect the 
opportunity costs in a two-node network, this is not so in a meshed network. The net benefits 
of the line investment should take account the impact elsewhere in the network (here the 
change in the line rentals between G1 - D3 and G2 - D3). 
 
A powerful solution to the problem has been developed by Bushnell & Stoft in series of 
articles [1996a-d, 1997]; variations have been implemented in the USA and have come to be 
known as incremental financial transmission rights (FTRs). The crucial step is to modify the 
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investment reward system such that new investment is rewarded by a “must-accept” set of 
FTRs, which in essence captures the incremental external effects of the new investment over 
and above the direct rewards of the invested line. It is important to realize that the FTR pays 
}~
ij· (pj - pi) to its owner; in the proposal, the merchant line investor is the owner. As above, pi 
1sC'2;!E3#A'C3!H	1@M9G'CﬃA#v !<1

}~
ij is the FTR strike quantity of line ij, representing the difference 
between the dispatched flow after and before the line investment. Note that the value of a so-
defined FTR can be negative. The investor would have to accept the set of so-defined FTRs 
for all affected lines. Bushnell & Stoft [1996c, p. 73] show that if the consolidated set of 
contracts match the current dispatch “then no group of agents whose contracts match their 
dispatch will find it profitable to make detrimental alterations to the grid.”23 
 
The key modification is to capture the incremental network effects, which implies the step 
from link-based line rentals to network rentals on the one hand, and payment according to 
1ﬃAMHI*ﬃ'I\#!==?/n#78"g
}~
ij) rather than total flows (Rij) on the other. As a  result, the impact of 
the new line on the “entire” system is captured. In the example above, the new set of FTRs 
8#A-/n !
}~
12 = -100· (30- 7&!!!% }~ 13 = +400· (40-50) = - ﬀ!!!%ﬃ! }~ 23 = -
400· (40-30) = -4000, which in total sums to -6000.24 
 
The system is not without drawbacks. First, the system is path-dependent. It relies on changes 
in flows and thus always compares with the current situation. Since payment and thereby 
incentives for new investment rely on the current network, inefficiencies in the current 
network are likely to carry over. A second problem has been pointed out by Bushnell and 
Stoft [1996c, p. 77]. The requirements of matching of contracted and actual flows are 
extremely unlikely to be met. A third problem is more fundamental. This type of reward for 
the investment requires assessment of both the old and the new dispatch which is 
controversial. A central institution will have to decide on the external incremental power 
flows as the basis for the must-accept contracts. Hence, whether or not the investment will be 
profitable depends to a large extent on a discretionary decision making power of a 
commission. This may be unavoidable but principally contradicts the idea of decentralized, 
unregulated merchant. The point has been well put by Joskow & Tirole [2003, p. 42, italics in 
original]: “It should be clear as well that in practice the merchant transmission model cannot 
operate “as if by an invisible hand”, since some de facto regulatory authority must have the 
ability accurately to simulate load flows on the network, apply contingency criteria, define 
feasible sets and changes in feasible sets associated with transmission investments, and ensure 
that rights allocations are consistent with feasibility under numerous contingencies.” 
                                               
23
 Unclear is whether this is the same as “efficient investment”.  
24
 Note that the link-based LMP-FTR based price is part of the bigger scheme. 
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Alternatively one could approach the problem with deep connection charges/payments to 
interconnectors. These are designed to reflect the costs and benefits resulting from the new 
investment, and accruing over the system as a whole. These can be calculated on a case-by-
case basis or a proxy might be developed. In a link-based system, the effects pointed out 
above would have to be included in the deep connection charges. The problem is that if the 
external effects are substantial (relative to the revenues of the link-based price differentials), a 
significant proportion of costs and benefits are effectively not market based, but determined 
by a centralized institution. 
 
The network effects are typical for AC networks, whereas the problem rapidly loses relevance 
with controllable DC lines. Consider the example in figure 3. The “bad” modification as 
exemplified in figure 3b is caused by the loopflow problem. Kirchhof’s laws dictate that the 
power flow on R23 is less than 900, because of the proportional split and the line constraint on 
R12. This no longer holds if the new line R12 is a controllable flow. If in the example in figure 
3b the flows are controllable, the new line simply would not be used (i.e. the flow would be 
set at zero) and the dispatch could be as in figure 3a. It is thus unlikely that the line would be 
built in the first place. As a result, controllable technology reduces the network effects and 
strengthens the relation between link-based LMP based profitability and welfare effects.25 
 
This problem sets the main difference between the nodal-pricing approach in the USA and 
zonal pricing in Europe and Australia: the system of incremental FTRs relies on the existence 
of nodal spot prices. Consequently, in Europe and Australia it cannot be implemented. Thus 
with incremental FTRs the scope for AC based network investments in the USA is larger than 
in link-based systems as in Europe and Australia, essentially because the network effects are 
not captured. It follows that in the zonal approach in Europe and Australia it would seem to be 
good policy to restrict merchant investment to DC interconnectors.  
 
4.4 Risk 
The last problem with market-driven transmission investment to be put forth here relies on 
high risks caused by monetary spill-over effects.26 The precise extent and nature of the spill-
overs depends on how exactly the line investor is rewarded, but the result always is that 
revenue is uncertain. Within an LMP based scenario it appears quite difficult to find a perfect 
                                               
25
 The argument has larger application than merely part of a meshed network if the three nodes are considered to 
be for instance France, UK and Benelux and the interconnectors are AC or DC lines.  
26
 It must be emphasized that these should be distinguished from real external effects.  
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hedge. It follows that market-based transmission investment may be quite risky which will 
tend to suppress investment levels. 
 
Suppose first that the line owner is paid according to link-based LMP line rentals. The profits 
would be: ( ) Kppq ijijij −−⋅=pi  
where qij denotes the real flow in the line ij, pi and pj are the spot prices at nodes i and j and K 
is the investment cost. In this setting the investor is extremely vulnerable to investments 
elsewhere in the network. Not only the spot prices may vary beyond its control, but due to 
loopflows, the quantity may also be variable, which is well illustrated by figures 3a and 3b. 
Importantly, once invested the returns are largely beyond control of the investor, which, given 
the interactions of meshed networks, makes it rather hazardous. 
 
Second, suppose that the line owner sells off FTRs to network users over and above the line 
rentals. Denote A as the (auction) revenue of the sold FTRs. The investor’s profit is:  ( ) ( ) AKppRppq ijijijijij +−−⋅−−⋅=pi  
If the real flows (qij) and the FTR’s strike quantity (Rij) match, the investor is insulated 
against changes in the spot prices. However, the investor is vulnerable against the quantity 
effect: any new investment (or demand) will affect the real power flows. It quickly follows 
that profit decreases if qij decreases. As above, with non-controllable flow the power flows are 
largely beyond the control of the line owner and thus despite hedging, considerable risks 
remain. 
 
Third, suppose that the line investor is rewarded with FTRs (as opposed to line rentals). The 
investor’s profit then is as follows: ( ) KppR ijijij −−⋅=pi  
The investor is insulated against quantity risk. Instead, it is now vulnerable to the spot prices. 
If the differential decreases, profit decreases. This is likely to happen, if for instance a new 
power plant is built in the vicinity of the high priced node.27 It may be recalled that high nodal 
spot prices signals new investment opportunities and that risks involved in the third scenario 
readily translate to the Bushnell & Stoft network-based payment as characterized above.  
 
A fourth option allocates FTRs to the line owner, who then auctions off the FTRs to the users. 
Both the congestion charges as well as payment to the FTR owners are taken care off by the 
system operator and beyond the line owner. The line owner’s profit would be:  
                                               
27
 In fact, Directlink, one of the merchant projects in Australia (connecting Queensland and New South Wales), 
faced this problem. 
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KAij −=pi  
The ex-post risks would be shifted completely to the users. The line owner would only have 
the ex-ante risk of the auction revenue, which depends on the definition of the FTRs. 
Moreover the FTRs prices derived from the auctions presumably reflect a risk premium, 
which in turn depends on the level of uncertainty.  
 
The examples illustrate that the risk (-allocation) depends on the type of reward, which in turn 
depends on the institutions. The effect of the risk will be to require a high risk premium and 
hence to increase cost of capital, or make isolated projects unprofitable altogether. Whether 
the risks are prohibitively high or manageable is an empirical matter. Overall the difference 
between controllable and non-controllable seems decisive. The loopflows in the non-
controllable system make the actual (future) flows rather difficult to predict; the risks are 
amplified by loopflows. In contrast, the quantity in the controllable line can be determined by 
the owner which reduces the problem.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Notwithstanding drawbacks, market-based transmission investment may well have sufficient 
advantages  to support  close examination. First, the (monopolized and regulated) alternatives 
do have well-known drawbacks as well, among which under-investment. Second, market-
based transmission investment takes place in practice. Third, legislators and regulators are 
developing regulatory frameworks to approach the situation [cf. e.g. Newbery, Von der Fehr 
& Van Damme, 2003]. Whether these are permanent developments is as yet an open question, 
but they do justify attention. 
 
This paper focuses on the institutions in Europe and Australia and thereby on interconnectors 
between different systems. Europe and Australia rely on zonal pricing in contrast to the USA 
where nodal pricing is settling. It is argued that new high-voltage direct-current (HVDC) 
interconnectors can well be market based. The investment would be financed by trading on 
the price difference between the two ends of the line; reliability effects on both ends of the 
line would have to be taken into account separately. Especially in the European and 
Australian zonal approach, merchant alternating current (AC) investment appears problematic 
and it should better be reserved for the designated transmission system operators. 
 
Four main problem areas of market-based transmission investment have been examined with 
respect to the distinction between controllable and non-controllable flow. A first problem is 
economies of scale. At least theoretically the argument can be made that market-based 
investment will be smaller than optimal. The severity of the problem depends on the size of 
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the line relative to the market. Typically DC lines are used to interconnect different network 
areas between which potential power flows can be expected to be large, reducing the severity 
of the problem. Furthermore, deep compensation for additional costs and benefits may 
increase or mitigate the problem. Associated in particular with DC interconnectors, 
compensation for increased reliability offers scope. 
 
A second problem is that market-based investment may actually be a monopoly investment. 
The severity reduces if the market is large as compared to the lines, because at  some point the 
market may allow competing lines. More importantly, parallel DC lines being controllable 
can actually be competitive. In contrast, on AC “parallel” lines, the non-controllable flows 
over the lines would effectively be bundled and could not compete. Hence, competitive 
potential between lines, if at all, requires controllable flow and will thus reduce the severity of 
the monopoly problem for controllable lines. 
 
A third problem is that the LMP-based reward for new transmission investment either may be 
inefficient or require a modification of the rule, which inevitably is a move away from 
decentralized decision making. In the face of loopflows, a reward system based on the spot 
prices at the two ends of the line only (“link based”) may well be inefficient, because impacts 
elsewhere in the network are not reflected in the revenues. The way out is to modify the rule 
by creating a set of incremental payments (“network based”), reflecting the impact of the line 
in other parts of the network. The main problem with this is that this has to be estimated by a 
centralized agency and is open to controversy and legal challenges; thereby, the major 
advantage of market-based transmission investment would vanish. A system of point-to-point 
incremental FTRs has been implemented in several regions in the USA to tackle this problem. 
This approach requires nodal spot pricing (LMPs), and thus cannot be applied in Europe and 
Australia, where zonal pricing is predominant. Since the problem is inherently related to 
loopflows and thus typical for meshed AC networks, in a zonal (link-based) system it seems 
to be good policy to restrict merchant investment to DC interconnectors. 
 
A fourth problem is risk. Ultimately, market-based lines are rewarded by the revenues coming 
from flows and prices determined in the market. Provided liquid markets for these financial 
instruments exist, it is possible to hedge these risks but the hedging will never be perfect. 
Insulation against price volatility can be achieved, but hedging quantity volatility as well 
seems more difficult. Quantity is the main point which cannot be controlled on a non-
controllable line and hence risks seems higher for non-controllable lines. 
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Further research might focus on the following two aspects. First, the distinction between 
controllable and non-controllable flow might distort investment decisions between different 
types of technology. To determine whether this is an empirically relevant effect, demands 
further examination. Second, the term ‘unregulated’ as used in this paper means that the 
revenues are not regulated. At the same time, a regulator or legislator might well require other 
regulatory provisions, for instance concerning third-party access to the line. The approaches 
differ quite strongly between the USA and Australia; the framework in Europe still has to be 
settled. 
 
References 
ACCC, 2001, Amendments to the National Electricity Code: Network pricing and market 
network service providers, File no. C1999/441, Sept. 21, 2001, ACCC. 
ACCC, 2003, Discussion paper: Review of the regulatory test, 5 Feb. 2003, Australian 
Competition & Consumer Commission. 
Arrillaga, J., 1998 (2nd ed.), High voltage direct current  transmission, IEE Power and Energy 
Series 29, IEE, London. 
Bohn, R.E., Caramanis, M.C. & Schweppe, F.C., 1984, ‘Optimal pricing in electrical 
networks over space and time’, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 360-
376. 
Brunekreeft, G., 2003, Regulation and competition policy in the electricity market, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden. 
Bushnell, J.B. & Stoft, S.E., 1996a, ‘Grid investment: Can a market do the job?’, Electricity 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 74-79. 
Bushnell, J.B. & Stoft, S.E., 1996b, ‘Electric grid investment under a contract network 
regime’,  PWP-034, Jan. 1996, University of California Energy Institute. 
Bushnell, J.B. & Stoft, S.E., 1996c, ‘Electric grid investment under a contract network 
regime’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 61-79. 
Bushnell,. J.B. & Stoft, S.E., 1996d, ‘Transmission and generation investment in a 
competitive electric power industry’,  PWP-030, Jan. 1996, UCEI, Berkeley, 
California. 
Bushnell, J.B. & Stoft, S.E., 1997, ‘Improving private incentives for electric grid investment’, 
Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 85-108. 
Chao, H.-P. & Peck, S., 1996, ‘A market mechanism for electric power transmission’, Journal 
of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 25-59. 
EC, 2002, Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and 
gas market, Commission Staff Working Paper, Oct. 2002, SEC(2002)1038, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
EC, 2003, Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, OJ. L176/1, 15.07.2003, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
Fuldner, 1998, “Upgrading transmission capacity for wholesale power trade”, EIA/DOE 
(USA). 
Gans, J. & King, S., 2003, “Access holidays: The panacea for network infrastructure 
investment?”, mimeo, March 2003, University of Melbourne. 
Gilbert, R., 1989, “Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency”, in: Schmalensee, R. & 
Willig, R.D. (eds.), 1989, Handbook of Industrial Organization, pp. 475-535, North-
Holland. 
 23 
Gilbert, R., Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D.M., 2002, “Allocating transmission to mitigate market 
power in electricity networks”, Working Paper CMI EP 07, University of Cambridge. 
Gyugi, L., 1999, “Power transmission control: basic theory; problems and needs; FACTS 
solutions”, in: Song, Y.H. & Johns, A.T., 1999, Flexible ac transmission systems 
(FACTS), Ch. 1, pp. 1-72, IEE Power and Energy Series 30, IEE, London. 
Hogan, W.W., 1992, ‘Contract networks for electric power transmission’, Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 211-242. 
Hogan, W.W., 2003, ‘Transmission market design’, presented at Electricity Deregulation: 
Where to from here? Conference at Texas A&M University, April 4th, 2003. 
Joskow, P.L., 2003, ‘The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the U.S.’, 
Working Paper, CMI EP 28, University of Cambridge / MIT. 
Joskow, P.L. & Tirole, J., 2000, ‘Transmission rights and market power on electric power 
networks’, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 450-487. 
Joskow, P.L. & Tirole, J., 2003, ‘Merchant transmission investment’, Working Paper CMI EP 
24, University of Cambridge / MIT, May 2003. 
Kahn, A., 2002, untitled document, Statement for Transgrid, July 03, 2003, www.nera.com. 
Kattuman, P.A., Green, R.J. & Bialek, J.W., 2003, ‘A tracing method for pricing inter-area 
electricity trades’, mimeo, University of Cambridge. 
Littlechild, S., 2003, ‘Transmission regulation, merchant investment, and the experience of 
SNI and Murraylink in the Australian National Electricity Market’, mimeo, June 2003, 
downloadable from www.ksg.harvard.edu, HEPG Harvard. 
Mohring, H. & Harwitz, M., 1962, ‘Highway benefits: An analytical framework’, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston, II. 
NEMMCO, 2001, Determination under clause 5.6.6 of the code: SNI Option, 06 Dec. 2001, 
NEMMCO, Australia, www.nemmco.com.au. 
Newbery, D.N., Von der Fehr, N.-H. & Van Damme, E., 2003, “UK-Netherlands DC 
interconnector”, report of the Market Surveillance Committee of DTe, The Hague, 
July 16, 2003. 
Oren, S.S., Spiller, P.T., Varaiya, P. & Wu F., 1995, ‘Nodal prices and transmission rights: A 
critical appraisal’, Electricity Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 24-35. 
Perez-Arriaga, I.J., Rubio, F.J., Puerta, J.F., Arceluz, J. & Marin, J., 1995, ‘Marginal pricing 
of transmission services: An analysis of cost recovery’, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 546-553. 
Read, E.G. & Sell, D.P.M., 1989, ‘Pricing and operation of transmission services: Short run 
aspects’, in: Turner, A., (ed.), 1989, Principles for pricing electricity transmission, 
Transpower New Zealand. 
Read, E.G., 1989, ‘Pricing and operation of transmission services: Long run aspects’, in: 
Turner, A., (ed.), 1989, Principles for pricing electricity transmission, Transpower 
New Zealand. 
Read, E.G., 2002, ‘Financial transmission rights for New Zealand: Issues and alternatives’, 
Study prepared for New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, Draft 2, April 
2002. 
Vazquez, C., Olmos, L. & Perez-Arriaga, I.J., 2002, ‘On the selection of the slack bus in 
mechanisms for transmission network cost allocation that are based on network 
utilization’, ITT Working Paper, IIT-01-108A, IIT, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 
Madrid. 
Woolf, F., 2003, Global transmission expansion: Recipes for success, PennWell, Tulsa. 
Wu, F., Varaiya, P., Spiller, P. & Oren, S., 1996, ‘Folk theorems on transmission pricing: 
Proofs and counterexamples’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 5-23. 
